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BERT LANGLEY, Respondent, V. PACIFIC GAS AND 
ELECTRIC CO)IP ANY, Appellant. 
[1) Electricity-Duties of· Electric Oompames.-While. provisions 
of rule 14 of Public Utilities Commission requiring an electric 
company to exercise reasonable diligence and care to furnish 
a continuous and sufficient supply of electricity to its cus-
tomers, and further declaring that such company shan not 
be liable for interruption or shortage of supply or any loss 
or damage occasioned thereby except that arising from its 
failure to exercise reasonable diligence, make clear that such 
company is not an insurer or guarantor of service, they do 
not abrogate its general duty to exercise reasonable care in 
operating its system to a,oid unreasonable risks of harm to 
persons and property of its customers. (See Pub. Util. Code, 
§ 451.) 
(2) ld.-Duties of Electric Oompanies.-Where defendant electric 
company knew that a eontinuous supply of electric current 
was necessary to operate plaintiff's fish hatchery,knew that 
it could assure that supply either by furnishing current itself 
or by promptly not~ plaintiff of any failure so that he 
could obtain a substitute supply, and had twice notified plain-
tiff of an interruption of its service, and where plaintiff had 
given defendant his telephone number, the repairman who 
restored service was ealled to duty by a night telephone oper-
ator at defendant's office. and had that operator been given 
a list of customers to call in event of power failure the loss 
of plaintiff's fish as a result of failure to give notice of power 
shortage would have been averted, defendant failed to exer-
me reasonable care toward plaintiff. 
(8] ld.--Duties of Electric Companies.-In absence of knowledge 
of particular needs of a customer, a utility is not required 
to give notice of a power failure; if it has such knowledge, 
it is required only to act in a reasonable manner under the 
circumstances. ' 
[4] ld.-Duties of Electric Oompanies.-It would not be unduly 
burdensome to a utility, at least where a telephone operator 
is on duty and utility has actual knowledge of power failure, 
[1] See Oal.Jur., Electricity, § 8; Am.Jur., Electricity, § 32. 
[2J Duty of public utility to notify patron in advance of tem-
porary suspension of sernce, note, 52 A.L.R. 1078. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-6] Electricity, 510; [7] Electricity, 
§ 25; [8, 9] Electricity, f 13. 
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to require it to make a reasonable effort to give notice to 
those customers who have informed it that they require notice 
to prevent serious loss in event of interruption in power 
supply. 
[6] ld.-Duties of Electric Oompanies.-To require an electric 
company to give notice to certain customers and not to others 
does not conflict with public policy of state that no public 
utility may grant any preference or advantage in its service 
to its customers (Pub. Util. Code, § 453). since there is no 
discrimination where the same duty to exercise reasonable 
care and diligence is owed to all customers similarly situated. 
[6] ld.-Duties of Electric Oompanies.-By undertaking to supply 
electricity to plaintiff, defendant electric company obligates 
itself to exercise reasonable care toward him, and failure to 
exercise such care has characteristics of both a breach of 
contract and a tort. 
[7] ld.-Loss of Property-Pleading.-While for certain purposes, 
such as statute of limitations and measure of damages 
it may be necessary to classify an action against an elec-
tric company for loss of property due to power failure 
as in contract or in tort, defendant was not prejudiced by 
any error in pleading defendant's failure to give notice as 
a breach of contract rather than as negligence, where action 
was brought within period of shortest applicable statute of 
limitations, and defendant knew of loss that might result 
from its failure to give notice, so that the measnre of damages 
under either theory was the same; and it was defendant's duty 
under either theory to exercise reasonable diligence to notify 
plaintiff of power failure. 
[8] ld. - Oontracts - Actions - Instructions. - In action against 
electric company for breach of written contract to furnish 
plaintiff with power necessary to operate his fish hatchery, 
any error in instructing jury with respect to an alleged oral 
promise that bound defendant to give notice of power failure 
was not prejudicial where jury, in returnmg verdict for 
plaintiff, necessarily found that defendant was aware of 
plaintiff's need for notice of power failure, that it failed 
to give him notice, and that its failure was proximate cause 
of death of flsh, since under these circumstances defendant 
failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence. 
[9] ld. - Oontracts - Actions - Instructions.-In action against 
electric company for breach of written contract to furnish 
plaintiff with power necessary to operate his fish hatchery, 
it was prejudicial error to instruct jury that if it returned 
a verdict in favor of plaintiff it could not award plaintiff 
any less than 16 cents per fish, where amount of damages 
. sustained by plaintiff was placed in issue by answer to com· 
plaint and instrudion removed that issue from consideration 
) 
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of j1ll'Y. and where, although plaintiff's testimony was only 
evidence concerning value of fish, jury was sole judge of his 
credibility and should have been left free to disbelieve him. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County. Byrl R. Salsman, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action for damages for breach of contract to supply electric 
energy. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions to 
retry issue of damages only. 
Robert H. Gerdes, Campbell, Custer, Warburton & Brit-
ton, W. R. Dunn and Austen D. Warburton for Appellant. 
Louis W. Myers, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
James F. Boccardo and Edward J. Niland for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plainillf Bert Langley brought this action 
against defendant Pacific Gas and Electric Company for 
breach of a contract wherein defendant allegedly agreed to 
furnish plaintiff with power necessary to operate plaintiff's 
fish hatchery, and in the event that delivery of power was sus-
pended, to give reasonable notice of such suspension to plain-
tiff. The evidence at the trial established that a power failure 
occurred, that defendant did not give plaintiff notice of such 
failure, and that as a result 78,000 of plaintiff's trout died. 
Plaintiff recovered judgment for $12,480 pursuant to a jury 
verdict. Defendant appeals, contending that it did not breach 
any contractual duty to plaintiff and that the trial court 
erroneously instructed the jury. 
Plaintiff built his hatchery in 1947. At the time of the 
accident he had about 80,000 trout, in seven concrete troughs, 
16 feet long, 16 inches wide, and 8 inches deep. It was 
necessary to have a continuous flow of running water in 
the troughs to supply oxygen to the trout. If the flow of 
water were cut off, the trout would die in from 20 to 30 
minutes. Plaintiff supplied water to the troughs by gravity 
flow from a reservoir that was kept full by an electric pump. 
The pump would automatically start and re:fill the reservoir 
when the water dropped to a certain level. The reservoir 
contained enough water to supply the troughs for about 
three and a half hours after the pump stopped. Plaintiff 
) 
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did not have a standby pump at the hatchery. If the power 
were shut off or the pump failed for any other reason, plaintiff 
was prepared to protect the trout in two ways. He could 
lessen the Bow of water from the reservoir to the troughs, 
so that the water would not be exhausted until about eight 
hours had passed. If it appeared that the pump could not 
be operated within that time, he had made arrangements 
for getting a portable gasoline power plant and pump within 
an hour. 
In 1947 plaintiff made arrangements with defendant for his 
power supply. Plaintiff testified that he told defendant's 
employees the nature of his business and of his need for a 
continuous supply of running water. He asked whether 
"you people have a man here, or service 24 hours a day, 
whereby I could receive notice in the event that there is to 
be a suspension of power .••. Otherwise, I will put in a 
gasoline pump." The employees oraUyassured plaintiff that 
he would be notified. Defendant began supplying plaintiff 
with power in October, 1947. Apparently a written contract 
was signed, although neither party produced it or a copy 
thereof at the trial. Early in 1948 plaintiff read in a news-
paper that there was a power shortage. He told one of de-
fendant's employees that he wished to be notified when 
there was a "brownout" and his power was cut off. He 
gave the employee his telephone number. On two occasions 
he received a notice from an employee, who stated that she 
had instructions to notify him when power was suspended, 
that on a certain date on a certain hour power would be sus· 
pended in his area, and that he should govern himself ac-
cordingly. Plaintiff took appropriate precautions. 
In the spring of 1948 plaintiff substituted a three horse· 
power electric motor for the smaller motor that he had previ. 
ously used. He asked defendant to supply him with additional 
power. On May 12, 1948, he signed a written agreement for 
the additional power at a rate different from that under the 
former arrangement. The agreement provided that defendant 
would furnish the electricity in accordance with the appli. 
cable rules and regulations of the Public Utilities Commis· 
sion. Rule 14 of the commission, relied upon by defendant, 
is set forth in the footnote.- It is not clear from the record 
""SHORTAGE OJ' SUPPLY AND INTERR·UP'1'lON OJ'DELIVERY 
"The Company will exercise reasonable diligence and care to fumish 
and deliver a continuous nnd sufficient supply of electri~ energy to the 
customer, but does not auarantee continuiq or su1Ii.eienq of auppq. 
I , 
) 
) 
Nov. 1953] LANGLEY tI. PACIFIC GAS & ELEc. Co. 659 
(41 C.2d 655; 262 P.2d 846] 
whether at the time this contract was executed defendant's· 
employees renewed their oral assurance that plaintiff would be 
given notice if the power failed; in any event, he assumed 
that the previous oral agreement was still in effect. 
Power failed in plaintiff's area at some time before 12 :01 
a. m. on July 5, 1951. At 12 :01 a. m. an unknown person 
called the telepl10ne op~rator at defendant's office and in-
formed her that the power was off. The operator promptly 
called the repair crew. Defendant's employees patrolled the 
area until they located tbe cause of the failure, a nonoperating 
voltage regulator. Tbey by-passed tbe regulator and restored 
service at about 5 :15 a. m. Defendant's employees did not 
at any time notify plaintiff that the power had failed. Plain-
tiff was at home tbat night and would have answered the 
telephone had be been called. When plaintiff arrived at tbe 
hatcbery tbe following morning. 78.000 of bis 80,000 trout 
were dead. 
Plaintiff brought this action for breach of an "oral and 
written" contract whereby defendant allegedly promised to 
give him reasonable notice in the event that it was necessary 
to suspend delivery of electricity. Plaintiff took the posi-
tion at the trial that the cause of the power failure was 
immaterial. and in effect conceded that defendant had exercised 
due diligence in supplying him with electricity and in restor-
in~ service after the failure. Defendant's motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings. a nonsuit. and a directed verdict 
were denied. and the cause was submitted to the jury. The 
jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, awarding dam-
ages at $12,480. Defendant'8 motions lor judgment not-
witbstanding the verdict and for a new trial were denied. 
Defendant appeals from the judgment entered on the verdict. 
Defendant contends tbat the trial eou~ Gould not have 
The Company will not be Hable for interruption or shortage or inBUftl.· 
eieney of IJIlpply, or any loss or clamage of any kind or character 
oeeasionea thereby, if same is caused by inevitable accident, act of G04, 
fire, strikes, riots, war, or any other cause aeept that arising from its 
failure to exercise 1'easonable diligence. 
"The Company, whenever it shall. iind it necessary for the purpose of 
making repairs 01' improvements to its system, will have the right 
to napend temporarily the delivery of electric energy, but in all 
nch eases, as TeBsonable notice thereof as circumstances will permit, 
win be given to the customel'B, and the making of neb repail'B or im· 
provements will be prosecuted as rapidly as may be practicable, and, if 
practicable, at ncb times as will cause the least inconvenience to the 
customers. " 
Bee 44 C.B.C. 718, 719 i 17 CoB.C. US, 1M. 
I 
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admitted evidence of the oral negotiations and agreements 
preceding execution of the written contract on May 12, 1948, 
on the grounds that this instrument must be deemed tn be the 
complete expression of the agreement of the parties, and that 
parol evidence is therefore inadmissible to vary or contradict 
its terms. (See Guerin v. Kirst, 33 Cal,2d 402, 410 [202 
P.2d 10,7 A.L.R.2d 922] ; Mt'ller v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 
219 Cal. 120, 128 [25 P.2d 420] ; Parker v. Meneley, 106 Cal. 
App.2d 391, 399 [235 P.2d 101].) Plaintiff, on the other 
hand, contends that evidence of the oral agreement in . the 
present case was properly admitted, relying· on the rule that 
the parol evidence rule does not •• render inadmissible proof 
of contemporaneous oral agreements collateral to, and not 
inconsistent with, a written contract where the latter is either 
incomplete or silent on the subject, and the circumstances 
justify an inference that it was not intended to constitute a 
final inclusive statement of the transaction. tJ (Ellis v. Klaff. 
96 Cal.App.2d 471. 476 [216 P.2d 15] ; Stockburger v. DoZan, 
14 Ca1.2d 313, 317 [94 P.2d 33, 128 A.L.R. 83]; Orawford 
v. France, 219 Cal. 439, 443-445 [27 P.2d 645].) It is un-
necessary, however, to resolve these contentions if it is deter-
mined that under the written contract defendant assumed 
the duty to exercise reasonable diligence to notify plaintiff 
of any interruption in the supply of power. Accordingly, 
the first question presented for determination is the extent of 
defendant's obligations under the written contract. 
[1] As noted above, defendant agreed to furnish elec-
tricity in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations 
of the Public Utilities Commission. Rule 14 requires de· 
fendant to exercise .. reasonable diligence and care" to fur-
nish a continuous and sufficient supply of electricity to its 
customers. It further provides that defendant shall "not 
be liable for interruption or shortage or insufficiency of supply, 
or any loss or damage of any kind or character occasioned 
thereby . . . except that arising from its failure to exercise 
reasonable diligence." Defendant contends that under these 
provisions its duty is limited to exercising reasonable diligence 
to furnish a continuous and sufficient supply of electricity, 
and that it is under no duty to exercise reasonable care or 
diligence to prevent loss from power failure when it is not 
legally responsible for the power failure itself. These pro-
visions deal with the duty to supply power, and they make 
clear that defendant is not an insurer or guarantor of service. 
In no way, however, do they abrogate defendant's general 
/ 
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duty to exercise reasonable care in operating its system to 
avoid unreasonable risks of harm to the persons and property 
of its customers. (See Pub. Util. Code, § 451.) 
In the present case it is undisputed that defendllnt was 
not responsible for the power failure and that it exercised 
reasonable diligence to restore service. Accordingly, the 
question presented is whether on the record before us it could 
reasonably be concluded that its duty. to exercise due care 
toward plaintift' in the operation of its system required it 
to give notice of the power failure when it knew that the 
failure to give notice would result in serious loss. In an 
analogous situation, a common carrier does not have a duty to 
transport goods immediately, but merely to use diligence to 
deliver goods offered for shipment within a reasonable time 
in view of all the circumstances. Nevertheless, it is the 
general rule that if the carrier is aware that causes· of 
unusual delay exist of which the shipper is unaware, and does 
not inform the shipper of the facts, the carrier is liable for 
injuries caused by delay that would otherwise be excusable. 
(Eastern Railway Co.v. Littlefield, 237 U.S. 140. 145 [35 
S.Ct. 489, 59 L.Ed. 878]; Joynes v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
235 Pa. 232. 237 [83 A. 1016] ; 80utheadem E:epress Co. v. 
Bowers, Inc., 21 Tenn.App. 295 [109 S.W.2d 851, 854-855] ; 
see, 4 Williston on Contracts, § 1095, p. 3074.) 
[2] In the present ease, defendant knew that a continuous 
supply of electric current to plaintiff was imperative. It 
knew that it could assure that supply either by furnishing 
the current itself or by promptly notifying plaintiff of any 
failure so that be could obtain a substitute supply. Twice, 
in fact, defendant did notify plaintiff of an interruption in 
its service. Plaintiff bad given defendant bis telephone 
number. The repairman who restored service was called to 
duty by a night telephone operator at defendant's office. 
Had that operator been given a list of customers to call in 
the event of a power failure, the loss to plaintiff would have 
been averted. Under these circumstances defendant failed 
to exercise reasonable care toward plaintift'. 
Defendant contends, however, that it is physically im-
possible for it to first ascertain the loss that may occur to 
each of its million customers in the event of a power failure, 
and then to take steps, other than diligent efforts to restore 
service, to diminish or prevent such losses. Defendant is 
under no duty to do so. [3] In the absence of knowledge 
/ 
/ 
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of the particular needs of a customer, a utility is not required 
to give notice of a power failure. (Brame v. Light, Heat & 
Water Co., 95 Miss. 26, 33 [48 So. 728]; Stroup v. Alabama 
Power Co., 216 AIll. 290 [113 So. 18, 20, 52 A.L.R. 1075}.) 
If it has such knowledge, it is required only to act in a 
reasonable manner under the circumstances. [4] It would 
not be unduly burdensome to a utility, at least in a case 
where, as here, a telephone operator is on duty and the 
utility has actual knowledge of the power failure, to require 
it to make a reasonable effort to give notice to those customers 
who have informed it that they require notice to prevent 
serious loss in the event of an interruption in the power supply. 
[5] Defendant contends that to require it to give notice 
to certain customers and not to others conflicts with the public 
policy of this state that no public utility may grant any 
preference or advantage in its service to its customers. (Pub. 
Util. Code, § 453.) Discrimination is not present however, 
since the same duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence 
is owed to all customers similarly situated. (See Humphreys 
v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 190 Ky. 733, 740 [229 
S.W. 117, 21 A.L.R. 664].) 
Defendant contends that unless the duty to give notice is 
expressly provided for in its contract with plaintiff, recovery 
cannot be had in an action on the contract but only in an 
action in tort for negligence. [6] By undertaking to supply 
electricity to plaintiff, defendant obligated itself to exercise 
reasonable care toward him, and failure to exercise such care 
has the characteristics of both a breach of contract and a 
tort. [7] For certain purposes, such as the statute of 
limitations, whether an attachment may issue, and the measure 
of damages, it may be necessary to classify an action such as 
this one as in contract or in tort. (See generally, L. B. 
Laboratories, Inc. v. MitcheU, 39 Ca1.2d 56, 61-63 [244 P.2d 
385] .) In the present case, however, it is immaterial whether 
the failure to exercise reasonable diligence to notify plaintiff 
be treated as a breach of contract or a tort. The action was 
brought within the period of the shortest applicable statute 
of limitations, and since defendant knew of the loss that 
might result from its failure to give notice, the measure of 
damages under either theory is the same. (Civ. Code, §§ 3300, 
3333; see Siminoff v. Jas. H. Goodman & Co. Bank, 18 Cal. 
App. 5, 15, 18 [121 P. 939].) Accordingly, whether or not 
plaintiff erred in pleading defendant's failure to give notice 
as a breach of contract rather than as negligence, defendant 
) 
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was not prejudiced. Under either theory it was under a duty 
to exercise reasonable diligence to notify plaintiff of the power 
failure. 
[8] In addition to instructing the jury on the theory that 
defendant was under a duty to exercise reasonable diligence 
to give notice, the trial court gave instructions with respect 
to the alleged oral promise that bound defendant to give 
notice. On either theory the jury, in returning a verdict for 
plaintiff, necessarily found that defendant was aware of 
plaintiff's need for notice of a power failure, that it failed 
to give him notice,· and that its failure was the proximate 
cause of the death of the trout. It is undisputed that de-
fendant knew of the power failure and made no effort to 
notify plaintiff. Under these circumstances defendant failed 
to exercise reasonable care and diligence, and any error in 
instructing with respect to the oral agreement was not prej-
udicial. (Heple v. Kluge, 114 CaI.App.2d 473. 482-483 [250 
P.2d 694].) 
[9] Defendant contends that the instruction that if the 
jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, u you cannot 
award the plaintiff any less than sixteen cents per fish," was 
prejudieially erroneous. We agree. The amount of damages 
sustained by plaintiff was placed in issue by the answer to 
the complaint. The ,instruction removed that issue from the 
consideration of the jury. Although plaintiff's testimony was 
the only evidence concerning the value of the fish, the jury 
was the sole judge of his credibility and should have been 
left free to disbelieve him. (Blank .v. Cotftn, 20 Cal.2d 457, 
461 [126 P.2d 868].) On cross-examination it was shown that 
plaintiff was not experienced in the business of raising. fish. 
The erroneous instruction on the issue of damages does not 
require a complete new trial, since the verdict of the jury on 
the issue of liability is amply supported by the evidence. 
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed to 
retry the issue of damages only. Each party is to bear its 
own costs on appeal. 
Gibson, C. J .. Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, 
J't concurred. 
EDMONDS, J .-1 concur in the conclusion that the instruc-
tion concerning the measure of damages was prejudicially 
erroneous, but I dissent from the order directing that a new 
trial be limited to the issue of damages only. 
\ 
I, 
\ 
\ 
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The complaint alleged that the "plaintiff and the defendant 
entered into an oral and written contract, whereby defendant 
agreed to furnish to plaintiff the necessary power for the 
operation of plaintiff's fish hatchery, and further agreed that 
in the event it was necessary to suspend temporarily the de-
livery of electric energy, said defendant would give a rcason-
able notice to plaintiff .... That on or about the 4th of July, 
1948, defendant without warning to plaintiff did cause an 
interruption in the supply of electrical power to plaintiff's 
fish hatchery, and that as a direct result thereof and before 
plaintiff could take the necessary steps for the protection of 
the fish contained in said fish hatchery, some 78,000 rainbow 
trout died from lack of fresh water." 
These allegations state no cause of action either in contract 
or in tort. They include no statement that the power com-
pany did not give notice, as it assertedly promised to do, nor 
do they charge it with any failure to exercise reasonable dili-
gence. 
The case was tried upon the theory that the power company 
was liable under the terms of the oral contraet relied upon 
by Langley. As stated by his counsel in resisting a motion 
for a judgment on the pleadings, "The issue is simple. There 
was an agreement to give this man notice that the power was 
disconnected; the power was disconnected, and he wasn't given 
notice. I don't know how else you could say it." Similar state-
ments were made by him in his opening statement to the jury, 
~n his closing argument, and in resisting a motion for a directed 
verdict. In connection with this last proceeding, counsel for 
the power company asked: "In order that we may put in our 
defense, will the Court indicate the theory upon which we 
may be held liable'" The court's reply was: "The plaintiff's 
testimony shows ... the plaintiff's claim of an oral agree-
ment. " 
The issue of the power company's liability was submitted 
to the jury under alternative theories of recovery. By one 
instruction, the jurors were told: "In addition to the terms 
of the written contract, there is evidence of an oral agreement 
between the parties providing for the giving of notice to the • 
Plaintiff by the Defendant in the event of any interruption 
of power. If you find that such an agreement existed, the duty 
and obligation of the Defendant to give such notice cannot be 
excused by any circumstances, and if you find that the defend-
ant made such an agreement and then failed to fulfill it and, 
) 
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as a result thereof, the Plaintiff sustained damage, your ver· 
dict must be in favor of Plaintiff .... " 
A rule of the Public Utilities Commission which, by statute 
was a part of the written contract for service to Langley, 
stated the duties of the company in the event of an interrup-
tion in the delivery of power. The contract, as enlarged by 
~he rule, provided for the very contingency which is the basis 
of the cause of action, and parol evidence was not admissible 
to prove a collateral oral agreement relating to the same sub-
ject. (Kunz v. Anglo & London Paris Nat. Bank, 214 Cal. 
341, 346-347 [5 P.2d 417]; Pacific States Securities Co. v. 
Steiner, 192 Cal. 376 [220 P. 304] ; Heffner v. Gross, 179 Cal. 
738,742 [178 P. 860] ; United Iron Works v. Outer H. etc. Co., 
168 Cal. 81, 84-85 [141 P. 917J; Germain Fruit Co. v. J. K. 
Armsby Co., 153 Cal. 585, 594 [96 P. 319].) Accordingly, 
evidence as to a contemporaneous oral agreement was errone-
ously admitted, and an instruction upon that theory should 
not have been given. 
The jurors were also instructed that by the written contract 
of the parties, the power company was liable for any loss or 
damage occasioned by the interruption of power if such loss 
or damage was caused by the failure to exercise reasonable 
diligence. They were told that, in appraising the conduct of 
the company, they should determine whether it knew of the 
hazardous nature of Langley's business and whether it reason-
ably should have foreseen that an interruption in the supply 
of current would result in loss to him .. 
In deciding in favor of Langley upon the issue of liability, 
the majority say that there is no necessity to decide the ques-
tion as to the admissibility of the parol evidence "if under 
the written contract defendant assumed the duty to exercise 
reasonable diligence to notify plaintiff of any interruption in 
the supply of pow6r." It has been held that "[i]n cases 
where it clearly appears that the jury did hot rely upon the 
erroneous instructions, the judgment may be affirmed on the 
ground that the error is not prejudiciaV' (Oettinger v. 
Stewart, 24 Ca1.2d 133, 140 [148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221].) 
But here the record does not show that situation. Instead, 
it presents a ease tried by counsel for both parties solely as 
one for damages arising from the asserted breach of an oral 
contract to give nO'tice. 
The basis for the conclusion that the erroneous instruction 
as to the oral contract was not prejudicial is quite uncertain. 
Reference is made to Heple v. Kluge, 114 Cal.App.2d 473 
I 
" J 
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[250 P.2d 694], in which it is stated that an erroneous instruc-
tion is not prejudicial" 'when the facts as to which the charge 
is made are admitted or uncontradicted, or where no other 
conclusion could be reasonably made from the evidence.' " 
(P.483.) Apparently, then, the power company is held liable 
upon the ground that, as a matter of law, the evidence shows 
a duty to exercise reasonable diligence to prevent damage by 
giving Langley reasonable notice of any interruption in the 
supply of power. 
In challenging the propriety of the instruction which stated 
that it "was liable for any loss or damage occasioned by the 
interruption of power if such loss or damage was caused by 
the failure to exercise reasonable diligence," the power com-
pany points to the written contract which provides that" The 
Company will not be liable for interruption or shortage or 
insufficiency of supply, or any loss or damage of any kind or 
character occasioned thereby, if same is caused by inevitable 
accident . • • or any other cause except that arising from 
its failure to exercise reasonable diligence." 
That this provision of itself does not create the duty stated 
in the instruction, apparently is conceded in the opinion in 
which it is stated: .. These provisions deal with the duty to 
supply power, and they make clear that defendant is not 
an insurer or guarantor of service. In no way, however, do 
they abrogate defendant's general duty to exercise reasonable 
care in operating its system to avoid unreasonable risks of 
harm to the persons and property of its customers. (See 
Pub. Util. Code, § 451.)" It appears, therefore, that the basis 
of the determination of liability is not a duty specifically 
created by the contract, but instead a general statutory one 
requiring a public utility to exercise reasonable care toward 
its customers, and the written contract is of importance only 
to prove such a relationship. 
No case is cited which holds that a power company may 
be held liable for a failure to notify customers of an acci-
dental interruption of the supply of electricity, as opposed to 
a situation where the company suspends the supply of power 
to effect repairs or for similar purpose. Brame v. Light, Heat, 
d: Water Co., 95 Miss. 26 [48 So. 728], and Stroup v. Ala-
bama Power Co., 216 Ala. 290 [113 So. 18, 52 A.L.R. 1075], 
are cases in the latter category. Nor is such a charge made 
in the complaint, which alleges only that the "plaintiff and 
the defendant entered into an oral and written contract, 
whereby defendant • • . agreed that in the event it was neces-
/ 
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sary to suspend temporarily the delivery of electric energy, 
said defendant would give a reasonable notice to plain-
ti1f ••• • " 
The complaint states no cause of action whatever, but the 
case was tried upon the theory that the power company had 
made an oral contract to give notice to Langley which it failed 
to ful1ill. Evidence in support of such theory was received 
erroneously by the trial court and the. jury instructed to 
return a verdict for Langley if it found that such a contract 
was made and breached. The jurors were also told that, by 
the written contract, the power company was liable to Langley 
for damages to his property because of a failure to exercise 
reasonable diligence "to notify him that the power was off." 
That instruction states a theory of recovery inconsistent with 
the one based upon an oral contract under which a failure 
to give notice was said to be inexcusable "by any circum-
stances." 
It is now held that evidence offered V> prove an oral contract 
might properly have been considered by the jury as the basis 
of liability upon the inconsistent theory of liability under 
the written contract. For that reason, the liability of· the 
power company is said to now be established as a matter of 
law, under a theory not pleaded in the complaint nor relied 
upon by the parties at the trial and upon which the jury was 
not instructed. 
Under certain circumstances, an appellate court may hold, 
as a matter of law, that specific cobduct does or does not 
amount to reasonable care toward a plaintiff. (C/. Pirkle 
v. Oakdale Union Grammar Seh. Did., 40 Cal.2d 207 [253 
P.2d 1]; Gray v. Brinkerhoff, ante, p. 180 [258 P.2d 
834].) But in those cases, the issue of the reasonableness of 
the conduct involved was presented by the pleadings and con-
sidered by the parties with full opportunity to present evidence 
upon it. The present record shows an' entirely different 
situation. 
I would reverse the judgment without quali1ication. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
8, 1953. Edmonds, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
Dooling, J. pro tem., did not participate thereiD. 
I' 
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coupled with the boy's love for his own father and his father's 
mother-show a case which as a matter of law entitled him 
to have his petition determined on its merits. It could only 
be determined on its merits by finding whether his interests 
would best be served by the appointment of the guardian 
whom he sought. If the finding in this respect were favor-
able, and his nominee was a fit and proper person (as was 
found), then he was entitled to an order granting his petition. 
The mere conclusional finding (that because the boy had a 
place in the home of his mother and stepfather it was not 
"necessary or convenient" to appoint a guardian for him) 
upon which the trial court and the majority here dispose of 
this case, begs the real issue. In fact, disposition of this case 
on that ground denies to Richard his day in court on the 
real issue. 
For further and adequate discussion of this case reference 
is made to, and I adopt, the decision prepared for the District 
Court of Appeal by Justice Goodell and concurred in by 
Presiding Justice Nourse, reported at 254 P.2d 960. 
The judgment should be reversed and the case tried on 
its merits. 
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